Based on texts and personal recollections, the paper discusses the origins and roots of Philipp Frank's philosophy of science as it was developed in Eastern Europe and later institutionalized in the United States. It takes into account the influence of Abel Rey and V. I.
In the late 19th and early 20th century the banner of the "bankruptcy of science" was flying again.
* The authority of the old, causal Newtonian and Laplacian mechanics had failed to find a unity goal of the sciences, and instead had given rise to diversities that themselves opened the floodgates to metaphysical misinterpretations and theological mystifications. To be sure even within the physical sciences there was a fight going on; candidates were energetics, conventionalism and relativism, very different from the Newtonian precedents.
Of course, any such movement produces, as if by Newton's third law, its opposition;
and that reaction is something that we are inheritors of, because one of the persons who took seriously the need for opposition against the bankruptcy movement was one who used to be very prominent but is now almost forgotten, although he is part of our own evolution. He is Abel Rey.
Rey was born in France in 1873 and lived until 1940. His teachers included Paul
Tannery and Henry Poincaré. Rey became a theoretical physicist, a psychophysicist, a historian and philosopher of science. At the Sorbonne, from 1932 on, he was in charge of the institute which he founded, the Institute for the History of Science and Technology; he thus overlapped with people like Hélène Metzger, Alexandre Koyré, and his student Gaston
Bachelard. Rey was immensely productive; he wrote at least 18 books on history and philosophy of science and on ancient Greek science -as far as I know, none of them seems to have been translated into English, and only one into German (see Rey 1908 Lenin (1909 Lenin ( /1972 In Frank's paper he argued that modern science was not at all a causally-based matter.
In fact, he adopted a version of Poincaré's conventionalism; in a key passage Frank (1907 Frank ( /1949 wrote that "the law of causality, the foundation of every theoretical science, can be neither confirmed nor disproved by experience; […] it is a purely conventional definition."
Here I want to point out one aspect of the fight waged by Frank and his circle. In those early years of the 20th century, the new thermodynamics, radioactivity and the like opened new frontiers for empiricists to attack the old "absolutes". They did so by embracing the notion of the primacy of statistical laws; after all Frank was a student of Ludwig Boltzmann and was thoroughly aware of statistical, probabilistic, and indeterminist views as alternatives to the ancient classical ones. This was undoubtedly reinforced by his awareness, while still a student at the university in Vienna, of the work of the great experimental physicist in radioactivity, namely Franz Serafin Exner, himself a former Boltzmann student and a member Of course we should also be aware that the attack on absolutes was a not very hidden fight against the stronghold of Austro-clericism in the universities and in the intellectual and political life. For example, in his 1907 article on the "Kausalgesetz", Frank (1907 Frank ( /1949 ended the last paragraph, as to make sure that the reader would not miss it, with the telling and surprising sentence: "With the question of world conception in the ethical-religious sense, all this has nothing whatsoever to do." declared his intention to be the construction of a system of concepts not only of natural science but one of total knowledge, a Gesamtwissenschaft, and so "to overcome the separation of unified science [Gesamtwissenschaft] into unrelated special sciences" (Carnap 1967 (Carnap /2003 . It would be possible to attain, he said, "an intersubjective, objective world […] identical for all observers" (ibid.) and so make an end run around supposedly essential differences between physics, biology, psychology etc. Kelsen. 7 (What a group! Wish we had had a film and a sound recording of that event.)
What did Frank now do? At Harvard he was teaching physics, relativity, thermodynamics, and philosophy of science, starting with a small course of 15 students, which then grew to 250. So he needed a teaching assistant, which is where I came in. Also, Frank published about 50 items, books and articles, during the 28 years in the United States.
And he founded organizations. There we come close to the Boston Colloquium for This was not forging a Gesamtwissenschaft, but it was a cross-cultural, intellectual feast in which they all could participate. Let me only add the obvious: what a privilege it was for myself, appointed as the young secretary to arrange these meetings, to participate, and to be followed by Robert Cohen in that same function in its later form. One can well realize how strong the infusion of the genetic material must have been at that time for some of us. It is not that we became Vienna Circle soldiers; but certainly, thanks to the generosity of this group, it allowed us in different ways to have a connection with the earlier message.
It is now more than five decades since this transfer of missions and responsibilities came to Boston University when the operations of Philipp Frank ceased in Cambridge. My story, which goes back five decades more, is one, you might agree, of intellectual honor discharged against tragic events. But I feel I must end with two notes. One is optimistic, the other is not.
Something has happened that brings us back to the time when Frank and colleges met at that coffee house to discuss the bankruptcy of science movement. On the one hand, there is within science today a move to pursue great projects at the intersection of two or more sciences; one thinks of genomics itself, of the fact that interdisciplinarity is the catch word in science. And that is all to the good, and in its way it is a move toward fusion among different sciences.
But on the other hand, we face a more ominous part of the current Zeitgeist, analogous to one at the time when young Frank picked up the book by Abel Rey, and saw in it a demand to reassert and defend the true meaning of science, to fashion a new authority for science, to invigorate the philosophy of science. For as we here well know, during the last few decades powerful claims against science have again been asserted, raising once more this banner of bankruptcy. I need not give you examples of the excesses of post-modern and constructivist misinterpretations, or the abuse of scientific evidence in high politics, or the theologically and ideologically inspired dismissals of sciences being "merely mechanistic" (and here I'm quoting a recent Pope). We are in some ways right back to the place where Frank took up his battle on behalf of rational analysis of science, of philosophy, of the wider culture of our day.
There is work to be done.
